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Civil Warfare: Russian Foreign Policy Strategy in Eurasia
In the aftermath of NATO’s 2008 expansion into Eastern Europe, the Russian Federation
has implemented a new foreign policy strategy based upon hybrid warfare. This strategy aspires
to reorient Eurasia around a Russian nucleus of power and incorporates traditional hard power
and soft power tactics, including but not limited to, conventional military equipment, proxy
paramilitaries, and disinformation. The combined sum of these tactics has destabilized the
presence of western institutions in key European border countries, such as Ukraine and the
Republic of Georgia, allowing the Russian Federation to prevent E.U or U.S. influence in the
area, while promoting pro-Russian narratives, economic agreements, and military conventions.
Drawing on ground experience in Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia—as well as expert
knowledge from: U.N., OSCE, and EUMM reports, as well as academic journals and interviews,
this paper will analyze this Russian hard power – soft power strategy in Donbass, Ukraine and
South Ossetia, Georgia. Each representing two distinct paths the Russian Federation establishes
for “breakaway” regions, while underlining the implications of this Russian foreign policy shift
and how western nations ought to respond to prevent further proliferation of these hybrid
strategies in the post-Soviet space.

Map of regions where Russia is currently implementing this hybrid warfare strategy and foreign policy
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Overview – Russian Foreign Policy in 2020
The Russian Federation has come under global scrutiny over the past ten years for its
recent anti-western activist approach to foreign policy and its use of a foreign policy toolkit that
includes, but is not limited to: disinformation, propaganda, and even military escalation in the
post-Soviet space and global arena. However, these tools, and the larger foreign policy ambitions
they serve, are nothing new as far as the Russian foreign policy schema – and the
implementation of that schema is concerned. Military expansionism, buffer zone politics, and
disinformation have been integral to larger policy objectives for over 300 years; in the Russian
Empire, the Soviet Period, and now, in the Russian Federation. As the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace in Moscow stated in their 2019 analysis of Russian Foreign Policy, entitled
“Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective (in 2019)” –“…core components of the current
Russian toolkit have withstood the test of time, and there is every indication that Moscow will
continue to rely on them, even in a post-Putin era.”
The Russian Federation, although as media reports over the last ten years suggest, still
implements hard-power tools en masse, it is now implementing more adept means of achieving
its current foreign policy objectives – (i.e. hybrid warfare). What are Russia’s main foreign
policy objectives that hybrid warfare aims to achieve? Globally, they include: the restoration of
the Russian Federation’s ‘great power’ status that it enjoyed during the Russian Empire and the
Soviet period, the return of Russian hegemony over Eurasia, and the overall deterioration of the
U.S.-led unipolar global politique that came into being following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, in exchange for a multipolar world order, where Russia could play a more sizeable role in
global decisions.
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These foreign policy objectives were outlined in 1996 by ex-Russian Foreign Minister
Yevgeny Primakov, in what is now known as the “Primakov Doctrine” of Russian foreign
policy. When this ‘doctrine’ was written by the now reclaimed Primakov, the Russian Federation
had to begrudgingly associate itself with western political formats, struggle to adapt to market
capitalism, and see its regional influence wane more and more due to its internal political
instability and economic spiral. However, during the economic growth and stability of the 2000s
and the domestic consolidation of power within the Russian Federation, following the
implementation of Vladimir Putin’s “vertical of power” approach, the Russian Federation turned
its sights outwards for the premier time since the fall of the U.S.S.R.; first, to the Republic of
Georgia in 2008, and second, to Ukraine in 2014.
As the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Moscow asserts in their 2019
report on Russian foreign policy, “Contemporary Russian foreign policy displays the
unmistakable presence of three centuries-old drivers of Moscow’s posture on the world stage.
Chief among these drivers is:” one, “Russia’s quest for strategic depth and secure buffers against
external threats;” two, “expansion to satisfy its ambition as a great power;” and three, “it’s
complicated relationship with the west, which combines rivalry with the need for cooperation.”
All of which exemplify the tenants of the ‘Primakov Doctrine’ and underline Russian
expansionism in the post-Soviet space during the last decade. However, due to the limited means
of Russia’s military, economy, and political format in comparison with larger Western powers, it
must engage in opportunistic “military adventures” as the Free Russia Foundation has stated, and
enforce a foreign policy based upon hybrid warfare. This hybrid warfare uses hard power in the
form of discrete financing of paramilitary groups that enforce borderization in these “breakaway”
regions, and soft power vis-à-vis the manipulation of ethno-linguistic-religious ties and
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passportization, which obfuscate the legitimacy of conflict in these zones, often favouring
Russian outcomes.
For example, The Russo-Georgian War in 2008 was the largest instance of this newly
conceived Russian ‘troika’ of foreign policy, relying on the Putin-Medvedev approach to
‘Madman’ Foreign Policy, Strategic Patience, and the Primakov Doctrine. Following exGeorgian-President Mikheil Saakashvili’s military action to retake the de facto Republic of
South Ossetia in August 2008, the first signal in Russia’s switch from a near-Eastern partner with
which the West could negotiate amicably to an anti-western alternative power, was underway.
Subsequently, the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine, specifically in Donbass was where the
Russian Federation solidified its commitment to this anti-western path and the pursuance of this
Primakov ‘troika’ vis-à-vis hybrid warfare. This capstone will analyse both the case of South
Ossetia, Georgia in 2008 and after, and the case of Donbass, Ukraine in 2014 and after, and draw
conclusions on their effect, if any, on Russian foreign policy and the implications of the Russian
Federation’s use of hybrid warfare in 2020.

Russian Foreign
Policy

Primakov
Doctrine

Putin's 'Madman'
Foreign Policy

Hyrbid Warfare
Strategic Patience

Diagram 1.1 – Russian Foreign Policy: How the Primakov Doctrine is Achieved
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Case Study – South Ossetia, Republic of Georgia:
According to Georgian political commentator Gela Vasadze, “In 2008, for Berlin and
Paris, just like for many in Washington, Putin was still a good guy with whom you could and
should do business.” Therefore, the hope that the Russian Federation would continue to be a
partner to western countries was still feasible before and after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War,
albeit misguidedly. The Russian Federation in 2008, and well before it, had been on a path to
consolidating its power in Eurasia, specifically in areas such as South Ossetia, Georgia. A year
prior, at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, both then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev
and then-Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin had made remarks, indicating the Kremlin
would continue to pursue the Primakov Doctrine and utilize Russia’s growing military to protect
“Russian speakers” and Russian “interests” throughout the world (Atlantic Council).
In August of 2008, after ex-Georgian-President Mikheil Saakashvili mobilized Georgian
forces to take back Tskhinvali, the capital of the de facto Republic of South Ossetia, the world
saw the Russian Federation do exactly what it had promised a year prior in Munich. Within days
the Georgian military was fighting South Ossetian security forces and contingents of Russian
peacekeepers in the area around the de facto capital of South Ossetia, that is until the Russian
Federation intervened. Over 2,500 Russian land and air units, who were conducting a military
exercise in the Russian Military District of Ossetia (1 of 5 Military Districts in the Russian
Federation and positioned just North of South Ossetia when this Georgian assault took place),
quickly rushed to aid the small semiautonomous republic.
Russia and its South Ossetian allies quickly repelled the Georgian forces and soon began
a putsch into Georgian territory. This swift victory against an increasingly aggressive neighbour,
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Georgia, emboldened Russia; however, the casualties and loses the Russian forces underwent
from a considerably smaller and lesser trained Georgian force, proved that the Russian
Federation was still in no shape to claim it was a great military power. As a U.S. Army College
review of Russian involvement in the conflict indicated, “Russian military operationalization was
lagging – 60 percent of Russian military equipment broke down and were severely antiquated”
and added that “the general Russian invasion was ‘simple” which “caused higher Russian
casualties than was necessary.” Additionally, the Swedish Défense Research Agency, reviewing
Russian air capacity in the conflict, indicated that “the Russian air component showed a
‘remarkably’ limited capacity to wage air combat for a country aspiring to be a military great
power.” It seems that to deliver on their 2007 promise in Munich, the Kremlin would need to
pursue these opportunist military adventures in the post-Soviet space with soft power as well as
their growing military hard power in order to garner any success in other post-Soviet spaces.
In this regard, no other quotation could exemplify this post-2008 strategy more than the
following: “Russia creates the appearance of operating one step removed from the Russian
government” (Carnegie Endowment, 2019). In Georgia, the Russian Federation initially
accomplished this by acting on the existing controversy it had fuelled via proxy groups in the
years after the Georgian-South Ossetian conflicts of the 1990s. For example, prior to the 2008
Russo-Georgian War, the Russian Federation had installed more than one military base in de
facto South Ossetia, it had mobilized Russian “peacekeepers” throughout the region, and had
started a process known as “passportization” to make Russian-speakers, ex-Soviet citizens, and
those with ethnic ties to the Russian Federation, legitimate Russian citizens. By the time the
2008 Russo-Georgian War had started, this passportization process had been very successful and
around 90 percent of the population in South Ossetia had either South Ossetian or Russian
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passports (EUMM). During this process, waves of ethnic Georgians fled the area and those who
remained in de facto South Ossetia, were subjugated while their ability to participate in politics,
own property, and conduct business were severely diminished. These two processes, along with
the distribution of South Ossetian passports, had loosened and continues to loosen Tbilisi’s hold
on the breakaway region. Furthermore, this confusing political and military landscape has made
it easier for the Russian Federation to justify its military intervention in the area, as it was and is
protecting ethnic Russians and Russian citizens as well as its peacekeepers and military
personnel in de facto South Ossetia.
After the 2008 War, the Russian Federation has limited the influence of the E.U.
Monitoring Mission’s (EUMM) ability to conduct its peacekeeping engagement that was
outlined in the Russia and Georgia signed Six-Point Agreement, and has kept its hard-power
projection to borderization, base building, and military exercises which further limit external
involvement from Georgia or the EUMM. Simultaneously, the Russian Federation continues to
funnel money to social projects and pursue passportization across the de facto republic.
According to Reuters, Russia currently stations around 7,600 soldiers in the regions of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia and has built over three bases to conduct patrols and maintain borderization
efforts in the area.
To conclude, Russia’s first serious expression of this Primakov foreign policy ‘troika’
taught the Russian Foreign Ministry, military, and the Kremlin, that it must utilize considerable
soft power connected to ethno-linguistic-religious groups affiliated with the Russian Federation
and its ideals in order to support its existing hard power approach in the regions where it would
like to project power. This strategy would rely on civil society as well as political and economic
manipulation, which would aid in achieving one of two goals the Kremlin has for these
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breakaway regions: (one) to either incorporate regions such as South Ossetia into the Russian
Federation, or (two) to maintain their status as semiautonomous states within the home country,
ensuring the countries to which they belonged cannot obtain NATO or E.U. membership, and
remain in Russia’s sphere of influence. This strategy would slowly but surely achieve the three
primary objectives of the Primakov Doctrine: the restoration of the Russian Federation’s ‘great
power’ status that it enjoyed during the Russian Empire and the Soviet period, the return of
Russian hegemony over Eurasia, and the overall deterioration of the U.S.-led unipolar global
politique. In the case of South Ossetia, Georgia, the Russian Federation is implementing this
strategy to groom the semiautonomous republic for future incorporation into the Russian
Federation, based on its growing military presence, borderization and passportization efforts, and
consistent level financial assistance to the region.

Map 1.1 – Occupied Territories in the Republic of Georgia
Red: Russian-Occupied Territories Grey: Georgian Territory

Case Study – Donbass, Ukraine:
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The Russian Federation simplified its passport and citizenship process in 2012.
According to a report by the Atlantic Council, entitled “Separatists Launch New
‘Passportization’ Strategy in Eastern Ukraine” – the Russian Federation’s legislative body the
Duma, simplified the process and conditions for obtaining a Russian passport to include all
previous citizens or those directly related to citizens of the Russian Empire/ Soviet Union, those
who serve in the Russian military, and/or those who speak Russian natively. However, in order
to qualify for Russian citizenship under these new provisions, a person must renounce their
current citizenship. This, like the 2007 statements by Dimitri Medvedev and Vladimir Putin at
the 2007 Munich Security Conference, which precipitated in the 2008 Russo-Georgian War to
come, represented an imperative piece of the Russian Federation’s actual policy to secure its
influence in areas with distinct Russian-speaking and ethnically Russian populations in the postSoviet sphere, such as Crimea and Donbass, Ukraine.
In many ways, the passage of this law transcends the importance of the Maidan
Revolution, the later exodus of ex-Pro-Russian Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, and the
subsequent Russian invasion of Crimea and Donbass, Ukraine in 2014-2015. This law, along
with Russia’s perception of the Maidan Revolution, was foretelling of Russia’s impending
hybrid warfare in Ukraine and how it would engineer this hybrid war effort to maximize the
benefits that would be wrought by pursuing a new conflict in Ukraine.
First, the steps the Russian Federation had taken to cultivate and exacerbate its
relationship with Russian-speaking populations and the Russian diaspora in the “near-abroad” of
Eastern Europe was directly in accordance with Dmitri Medvedev’s assertion that Russia would
“protect Russians” and “Russian speakers” throughout the world at the 2007 Munich Security
Conference, before the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. In the time after that war, Russian reliance on
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these populations for legitimate and illegitimate influence in neighbouring countries only
widened, and with it, the previously mentioned 2012 Duma citizenship bill was passed. This bill
served to strengthen the ethno-linguist-religious arm of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy in the
region, and would make the Russian-speaking, ethnically Russian, and Russian Orthodox
population in Donbass and Crimea, Ukraine the focus for Russian and Russian proxy hard power
and soft power targets during and after the initial invasion in 2014-2015.
Second, paramilitaries, borderizations, and ceasefire violations. The Russian Federation
understood there were considerable military pitfalls during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and
intended to prevent further hard power failures from happening in the future. Between 2008 and
2014, the Kremlin had increased military funding, military research, and professional troop
numbers to compensate for the losses it underwent in Georgia. For example, Russian military
spending went from 3.14 percent of its GDP in 2008 to 4.14 percent in 2014 (WorldBank).
Furthermore, the Russian Federation’s set a goal to increase its total number of contracted
military personnel to 500,000 by 2020, which poses a significant growth from its estimated
200,000 contracted personnel in 2010. However, in the relatively short amount of time and under
the constraint of international observation, the Russian Federation had to act fast and act through
a third party pro-Russian group; in other words, a proxy force supported by Russian equipment
and trainers, instead of utilizing its growing military directly in Ukraine.
Shortly after Yanukovych fled the aftermath of Maidan in 2014, masked troops without
Russian insignias secured the centre of Sevastopol Crimea and quickly enacted a referendum to
allow the Crimean Peninsula to join the Russian Federation, while proxy groups launched an
assault across the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts that comprise Donbass, Ukraine, many of whom
using Russian military equipment and with armed support from Russian tank units.
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Third, semiautonomous statehood. The Russian Federation may have been able to silence
the demands of local Tartars and ethnic Ukrainians who did not agree with the separatist
‘referendum’ to join the Russian Federation, in Crimea, but the Russian strategy to employ a
paramilitary force and later pro-Russian proxy government in Donbass, Ukraine severely
overcalculated the sentiments of the Russian-speaking and ethnic Russian population present in
the Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts of Ukraine. Per the argument Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir
Putin gave in the years following the 2007 Munich Security Conference, which underlined a
Russian right to defend ethnic Russian and Russian-speakers, it seems that the Russian speakers
and ethnic Russian in Donbass, Ukraine were not eager to be defended. Although many
Ukrainians, like Georgians fleeing South Ossetia following the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, fled
Luhansk and Donetsk after the initial invasion and the bloody conflicts thereafter, those who
stayed as well as the ethnically Russian population in the Donbass region, were not as singular in
their support for Russian or Russian proxy intervention as the South Ossetians and ethnic
Russian in South Ossetia, Georgia were before and after 2008. For example, whereas 90 percent
of South Ossetians had either obtained proxy passports or Russian passports by the five-year
point, the official passportization process has barely begun in Donbass, Ukraine after more than
five years of stalled conflict.
Once the Russian Federation realized a referendum in Donbass was not immediately
possible, the Kremlin resorted to its hard power – soft power strategy, relying on strategic
patience and Vladimir Putin’s strain of ‘madman’ foreign policy to both eventually increase
pressure on Kyiv and exhaust the interest of its western partners in Europe and North America.
The most prominent way Russia has done this is through borderization and the use of ceasefire
violations (CFVs) along the Line of Contact (LOC) in the Republic of Luhansk and the Donetsk
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People’s Republic. Due to the recent nature of the conflict in Ukraine, it is still considered “hot”
and thus has demanded that Moscow pressure Kyiv with more hard power vis-à-vis its proxy
groups in the region. Whenever there is an international agreement related to Ukraine and
Donbass, such as Minsk I, Minsk II and the most recently, the Normandy Four Summit in Paris
in 2019, proxy groups have increased their activity along the Line of Contact. For example, the
E.U. Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine noted that between March 9 and 22 2020, after the
Normandy Four Summit, there were 11,300 CFVs including about 5,350 explosions. This
compares with about 9,100 and 3,150, respectively, in the previous two-week period.
Additionally, the Normandy Four Summit Agreements called for a reduction in overall ceasefire
violations, especially along crucial crossing points along the LOC at Zolote, Petrivske, and
Zolote, however, the SMM recorded a similar spike in CFVs in these areas during same this twoweek period.
Throughout the four years following the Russo-Georgian War, similar hostile measures
were used along the administrative boundary line (ABL) between de facto South Ossetia and
Georgia. These hard power measures were later reduced after Russian bases were established and
Russian troop exchanges were standardized across the ABL, satisfying the Kremlin’s immediate
objectives for the area.
In summation, the Russian hybrid strategy and the general conflict in Ukraine is a lot
fresher than that of the one in Georgia. Furthermore, there are no wounds from previous civil
wars to build upon, only the influence Russia has on its Russian speakers and ethnic Russians in
the region, so soft power methods, such as passportization are less effective, whereas hard power
methods, such as the use of borderization and CFVs, are more effective in exerting pressure on
Kyiv and consolidating the Kremlin’s goals for Donbass. This is reflected in the hotter conflicts
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and the repeated growth of CFVs along key points of the LOC. Given these factors, it is fair to
assess the Russian Federation would like to promote the independence of Donbass at all costs,
hoping then for the semiautonomous status of the Luhansk and Donetsk proxy governments in
later negotiations. If local elections for proxy governments, such as the ones the Kremlin has
pushed for in Minsk I, II and Paris occur, that would legitimize Donbass’ semi-autonomous
status and keep the rest of Ukraine within the Russian sphere of influence, especially once
Ukraine’s Western allies grow weary of supporting Kyiv and the rest of Ukraine becomes more
isolated and therefore dependant on cooperation with Moscow, following an eventual thaw in the
overall conflict.

Map 1.2 – Populations of Russian speakers vs. Ukrainian speakers across Ukraine
Red: Ukrainian Language Blue: Russian Language

Conclusion – The Three Goals of Russian Foreign Policy in Eurasia:
To conclude, there is nothing novel about Russian expansionism, save for how the Russian
Federation is executing it now in 2020. Under the guise of ethno-linguistic-religious ties or
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external controversy that is often manipulated by Russian sources, the Russian Federation
pursues a hard power putsch followed by a wave of reoccurring pseudo-military and soft power
escalations, which rely both on Putin’s belief in ‘strategic patience’ and the implementation of
his supposed spin on ‘Madman Foreign Policy’ in regions that are: (one) militaristically and
economically advantageous to Russian objectives, (two) contain sizeable Russian populations,
and (three) act as suitable buffer zones to stave off outside competitors (i.e. the E.U. and China).
To prevent the Russian Federation from replicating this hybrid warfare process in areas such as
Moldova, the Baltics, and Kazakhstan where similar conditions exist, as well as to prevent the
instability posed by the growth of multipolarity in global politics, western nations such as those
in the E.U. and the United States must maintain a level of cohesion regarding military and
economic pressure on the Russian Federation to negatively impact the Kremlin’s cost-benefit
analysis of these hybrid campaigns.

Parammilitaries/CFVs
Hard Power
Borderization
Russian Hybrid
Warfare
Ethno-LinguisticReligious Ties
Soft Power
Passportization

Diagram 1.2 – Russian Hybrid Warfare, Soft Power and Hard Power Strategies
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